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Abstract. The Reedy River flows through a relatively
small watershed that is rapidly experiencing growth. The
watershed is approximately 167,000 acres, but the upper
portions of the river include the urban areas of the City of
Greenville, Mauldin, and Simpsonville within Greenville
County, South Carolina. The lower portions of the river
flow through Laurens County as the Reedy joins the
Saluda River to form Lake Greenwood.
As the
population and the economy of the Reedy River
Watershed continue to expand, the demand on this river
resource will continue to increase.
For a number of years the Reedy River has been under
increasing pressure from various sources. Point source
and non-point source effluent loads have increased
considerably over the past decade, and the economic and
social costs of degradation have not been quantified or
assessed in relation to increased environmental stress
placed on the river system.
Recent water quality challenges in the United States
have stimulated sustained interest from policymakers to
incorporate the use of non-traditional market mechanisms
to lower costs of compliance and improve aquatic
environments. This type of approach allows facilities
with high pollution control costs to purchase lower cost
pollution reduction from another source to meet their
effluent reduction requirements. Water quality trading is
conceptually similar to air emissions trading, but effluent
trading has lagged in development. A few effluent
trading programs were developed in the early 1980s and
during the 1990s, but in recent years new interest has
sparked conversations about policy changes that would
improve the capabilities for local and state authorities to
implement water quality trading programs.
In January of 2003 the United States Environmental
Protection Agency issued rules through its water quality
policy statement to encourage the trading of nutrients and
sediments among point and non-point sources. Water

quality trading can provide greater flexibility and the
potential to achieve levels of environmental benefits that
would not otherwise be attained under a traditional
command and control approach. When working with
non-point source pollution problems, the USEPA is
required to work with individual states and local agencies
because of the provisions defined in the revision of the
Clean Water Act in 1987.
From a state and local level further analysis is needed
in order to asses the applicability of creating a water
quality trading program for the Reedy River Watershed.
This proposed paper will provide a conceptual
framework for how a water quality trading program may
be established within this watershed.
Background
research from other case study sites throughout the
United States will be incorporated with specific data
from the Reedy River Watershed to provide a detailed
analysis of how a water quality trading program might be
applied to the Reedy River Watershed.

Background and Related Work
Water Quality Trading Background
After learning from successful experiences with
emission trading programs focused on reducing acid rain,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) now actively supports the application of
emission trading to water quality. This approach seems
quite attractive because it could provide financial
incentives for increased pollution control activities in
unregulated sectors. Agriculture and urban runoff are
major contributors to effluent load levels in many
watersheds, but with a few exceptions these sources do
not fall under regulatory guidelines because of political
sensitivities and perceived monitoring difficulties
(Crutchfield, 1994).

Vast improvements in water quality throughout the
United States over the past three decades can be traced
primarily to conventional regulation approaches and
financial support given to point sources, municipalities,
and traditional large pipe dischargers.
Regulatory
initiatives concerning surface water policy in the United
States have been guided by the 1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, also known as the Clean Water
Act (CWA). This act and amendments in 1977 and 1987
set the overarching principles and implementation
mechanisms that direct the efforts to prevent water
pollution. The USEPA has been granted a primary tool
to regulate water pollution through the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). The NPDES
requires point sources to obtain state and USEPA
approved permits of defined number of pollutant
discharges. The USEPA and other federal agencies use a
variety of subsidies and grants to mitigate point source
(point source) and non-point source (non-point source)
pollution that does not fall under the NPDES criteria.
Various pollutants that are associated with non-point
source pollution include fecal bacteria, toxic organic
compounds, heavy metals, suspended solids and
sediments, phosphorus, nitrogen, and other oxygendemanding organic material.
Unlike point source
pollution, which tends to be a steady discharge, non-point
source pollution occurs during different times based on
periods of rainfall or the melting of snow. If unchecked,
these non-point source pollutants eventually reach our
lakes, rivers, oceans, and even underground sources of
drinking water as they seep into the ground. “Despite the
expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars over the
last 30 years, the 1972 Clean Water Act goals of fishable
and swimmable waters have not been achieved, largely
because contaminants from diffuse [non-point] sources
have not been controlled successfully” (National
Research Council, 2001).
Recent water quality challenges in the United States
have stimulated sustained interest from policymakers to
incorporate the use of non-traditional market mechanisms
to lower costs of compliance and improve aquatic
environments. This type of approach allows facilities
with high pollution control costs to purchase lower cost
pollution reduction from another source to meet their
effluent reduction requirements (USEPA, 2004). Water
quality trading is conceptually similar to air emissions
trading, but effluent trading has lagged in development.
A few effluent trading programs were developed in the
early 1980s and during the 1990s, but in recent years new
interest has sparked conversations about policy changes
that would improve the capabilities for local and state
authorities to implement water quality trading programs.
In January of 2003 the United States Environmental
Protection Agency issued rules through its water quality
policy statement to encourage the trading of nutrients and

sediments among point and non-point sources. The
policy states that its purpose is “to encourage states,
interstates agencies and tribes to develop and implement
water quality trading programs for nutrients, sediments,
and other pollutants where opportunities exist to achieve
water quality improvements at reduced costs” (USEPA,
2004). In that document the USEPA states that marketbased approaches like water quality trading provide
greater flexibility and have the potential to achieve levels
of environmental benefits that would not otherwise be
attained under a traditional command and control
approach. The policy focuses on the idea that different
sources within a watershed may face significantly
different costs to control the same pollutant. When
working with non-point source pollution problems, the
USEPA is required to work with individual states and
local agencies because of the provisions defined in the
revision of the Clean Water Act in 1987. The law leaves
non-point source control planning to the states and local
agencies because of local environmental and economic
considerations. “The actual site-specific selection of
particular management practices to control non-point
source pollution (called “Best Management Practices”)
will involve local environmental and economic
considerations, as well as considerations of effectiveness
and acceptability of the practice (USEPA 1984a)”
(Portney, 2000).
Phosphorous Loads and the Reedy River
In recent years Lake Greenwood, at the mouth of the
Reedy River, has been threatened by excessive nutrient
loading, intense algae blooms, and extensive oxygen
depletion in the bottom waters. A South Carolina
Department of Natural Resources Study completed this
year found that total phosphorus loading to the lake was
greatly affected by the amount of phosphorus contributed
by the Saluda River (74%) and the concentration of
phosphorus from the Reedy River (0.11% mg/L, 22%
higher than Saluda). Concentrations flowing into Lake
Greenwood exceeded the South Carolina standard for
piedmont lakes (0.06 mg/L) more than 68% of the time
from the Reedy River Arm (McKellar, Bulak, and
Taylor, 2008).
Water quality has improved over the past 30 years in
the Saluda-Reedy Watershed as a result of the Clean
Water Act (Hargett, Hargett, and Springs, 2005). But,
the most recent water quality assessment for the SaludaReedy Watershed indicated that several locations in Lake
Greenwood did not meet standards for Aquatic Life Use
Support (SCDHEC, 2004). Three locations within the
lake appeared on the 2006 list of impaired waters in
relation to excessive total phosphorus concentrations
(SCDHEC, 2006).

A substantial reduction of phosphorus loading from
both the Reedy River and the Saluda River is necessary
in order to realize a lake-wide improvement in water
quality. A 50% load reduction in both rivers would
greatly reduce the phosphorus concentrations throughout
the lake, especially in the Upper Reedy Arm. This type
of reduction could decrease the extent of extreme
hypoxia and the risk of severe algae blooms by about
31% throughout a given year (McKellar, Bulak, and
Taylor, 2008).

Research Design
Establishing a water quality trading program within the
Saluda-Reedy Watershed may provide the framework to
enable a 50% reduction of phosphorus loads. But, how
would the framework be constructed? What would be
the most important factors of creating a successful water
quality trading program within this basin? The research
design for this study was arranged in a way that focused
on economic and institutional failures of water quality
trading programs. Economic failure issues that were
identified in the literature included: the setting of an
optimal nutrient cap, property rights issues (initial
distribution of credits), current available and readily
accessible
information,
positive
and
negative
externalities generated from a trading program, and the
transaction costs of creating a trading program.
Institutional failure issues, many of which relate to the
establishment and maintenance of a market framework,
were identified included: the setting of a cap (TMDL),
the assigning of property rights concerning current
transactions that focused on risk and liability issues,
information that dealt with the starting point (baseline)
for trades between point and non-point sources, and the
role of monitoring and verification to identify positive
and negative externalities and minimize transactions
costs.
Information for this study was collected from four
water quality trading programs: Cherry Creek WQT
Program in Colorado, Tar-Pamlico River WQT Program
in North Carolina, Lower Boise River WQT Program in
Idaho, and Neuse River WQT Program in North
Carolina. Face-to-face interviews took place with state
and federal environmental officials, professionals and
private technical consultants contracted by trading
programs,
representatives
of
trading
program
organizations,
and
other
stakeholder
group
representatives during the month of April 2007. Two
local stakeholder meetings were observed: the Lower
Boise River Watershed Council (April 12, 2007) and the
Tar-Pamlico Association Meeting (April 25, 2007). Both
of these meetings included representatives from point

sources,
non-point
sources,
environmental organizations.

government,

and

Conclusions from Case Studies
The four case studies in this research analysis
identified some of the key economic and institutional
impediments constraining water quality trading programs
that promote point source to non-point source water
quality trades. The case studies analyzed revealed
distinctive environmental water quality stressors and
human settlement pressures with market and institutional
constraints. All four watersheds have experienced some
extreme form of nutrient related environmental
degradation episode or series of hazardous events over
the course of several years. Vast fish kills within each
basin have been the most dramatic and profound focusing
events to date. Two programs identified phosphorus as
the watershed limiting nutrient to be traded: Cherry
Creek and Lower Boise. The Tar-Pamlico program
focused both on phosphorus and nitrogen, and the Neuse
program dealt exclusively with nitrogen. Differences
between the case studies were revealed in the many
methods of program administration, structure for trading,
and performance of different trading strategies. These
differences can be explained through a distinct set of
factors that include trading drivers like regulatory
TMDLs or other caps on nutrient loads, local culture and
politics, investment and development influence from
federal, state, and local government agencies, and the
creation and development of water quality trading
organizational bodies.
Only one of the four programs has experienced at least
one point to non-point source trade. The Cherry Creek
Program has processed two trades that have included the
incorporation of a restored wetland site and a constructed
wetland site. The stakeholders involved in the trades
vividly described the laborious process of applying for,
negotiating, assessing, and monitoring credits. The
application, negotiation, and assessment of the credits
took place over the course of a year, and the monitoring
for the trades is still taking place to date. These types of
transaction costs are a major deterrent for trading
programs.
Transaction costs occur at every stage of the trading
process, but the four trading programs handled these
costs differently. The time spent on permit negotiation,
the search for trading partners, administrative
expenditures, transparent communication between
permittees and government agencies, regulatory staff
time, and monitoring and verification initiatives have
been handled in accordance to the structure of the
program. In both the Neuse program and the TarPamlico program the state of North Carolina shouldered

most of the transaction costs through the North Carolina
Agricultural Cost Share Program (for the Tar-Pamlico)
and through the North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement
Program (for the Neuse). The control and oversight for
environmental accountability in North Carolina for these
two programs is attained at the expense of higher staff
costs for agencies. In the Cherry Creek and Lower Boise
programs the transaction costs were mainly shouldered
by the point sources that were required to meet certain
discharge allocations based on their NPDES permits.
The key economic issue that makes water quality
trading appealing is the efficiency that is created when
one discharge source is able to more cost-effectively
reduce its outputs compared to another source. Without
this guideline then the program is not financially viable.
It is necessary that economic considerations are
incorporated into performance assessments of trading
programs in order for the programs to be considered
viable tools to achieve water quality standards. Types of
economic barriers related to high transaction costs, lack
of defined property rights, or a lack of good scientific
information prevent equitable and efficient negotiations
from occurring. Negotiations do not occur because the
lack of economic information increases the risk in
relation to the return on investment to the point source,
non-point source, or to both parties.
There are also several political constraints that were
observed in the case studies presented that dealt with the
institutional settings affecting the performance of the
programs. Institutional impediments that were identified
by the literature were also revealed in the cases, and are
directly related to the economic impediments. The
inability for government agencies to set caps, the
inability to assign property rights, the lack of good
information, the inability for the government entity to
account for positive and negative externalities, and the
inability to efficiently manage transaction costs were all
institutional failures highlighted in the case studies.
One of the institutional impediment examples within
the cases dealt with the effective implementation of the
programs. The Cherry Creek Authority was given a
statutory mandate by the State of Colorado to provide for
the use of trading within the basin. The North Carolina
programs were provided with state regulations and
nutrient limiting caps in order to direct trading initiatives.
Therefore, from an institutional setting everything was in
place to direct trades based on water quality regulation.
But, as the case studies revealed, effective
implementation of the programs did not occur
immediately
because
of
insufficient
funding,
undeveloped property rights, lack of political will, or
stakeholder inexperience with the understanding of the
water quality trading concept.

Discussion
The common assumption based on economic theory
that suggests that market-based approaches can be
directly substituted for outdated or inefficient traditional
regulatory procedures has not been supported by
evidence in the case studies presented. Market based
environmental trading programs are often touted as
alternatives to market regulation, but the markets are only
successful to the degree that there are binding caps and
allowances that are well defined. Water quality trading
programs require supportive legislation, strong
institutions, and effective monitoring and enforcement
procedures to be viable.
In order to create a successful water quality trading
program within the Reedy River and Saluda River Basins
in relation to Lake Greenwood certain economic and
institutional components are necessary. First, there must
be an in-depth understanding of the nutrient pollution
problem. This type of understanding is essential in order
to define the baseline conditions and the nutrient
reduction cap for a trading program. In fact, this type of
broad based monitoring throughout the watershed is
necessary in order to verify the effectiveness of any type
of nutrient reduction program, with or without markets.
Recent reports (McKellar, Bulak, and Taylor, 2008) have
provided phosphorus models for the Saluda-Reedy
Watershed that can determine load reduction goals for
policy makers.
Secondly, within the watershed there is a need to
accurately measure in-stream capacity. Monitoring and
assessment studies of the Reedy River Watershed have
determined that there is a significant phosphorus
concentration problem that will continue to increase with
pressures from point and non-point dischargers. Recent
studies (McKellar, Bulak, and Taylor, 2008) have
modeled phosphorus loads, algae dynamics, and oxygen
depletion factors throughout the watershed linked to Lake
Greenwood. This understanding of the specific nutrient
problem within a basin coupled with knowledge of where
the loads are coming from provides baseline information
necessary in order to evaluate water quality trading as a
policy option. An optimal cap must be set for critical
constituents in relation to baseline and in-stream capacity
information, and then ongoing monitoring of the
watershed must take place in order to verify changes to
water quality.
The next condition necessary for the assessing the
option to incorporate a water quality trading program
focuses on the number and type of potential buyers and
sellers of water quality credits. There must be a certain
number of interested point and non-point sources within
a basin for a trading program to develop. Point sources
are regulated, and may be required to participate in a
program to meet certain reductions, but non-point

sources must participate in a program in order to decrease
significant nutrient load amounts within specific
watersheds. A condition that would greatly increase the
option to implement a water quality trading program
would be the incorporation of some type of binding
constraint that linked point sources to non-point sources.
At the present time there are two large (more than one
million gallons per day) permitted domestic dischargers
along the Reedy River. There are seven similar facilities
along the Saluda River.
Another condition that is absolutely necessary for an
effective water quality trading program to become a
viable option is the retrieval and incorporation of better
information concerning non-point source nutrient
reductions. At the present time, as revealed by the case
studies, monitoring and verification is not necessarily a
condition of incorporating a trading program. The
knowledge of what levels of nutrients are being reduced
at non-point source credit sites is essential if the
effectiveness of a water quality trading program is to be
measured.
Lastly, both positive and negative externalities must be
considered when assessing the conditions under which
water quality trading is a viable option within the Reedy
River Watershed. When a cap is set and enforced, and
monitoring takes place, there is still the need to assess the
benefits and costs that are being generated by the
program. For instance, if the nutrient levels for a
particular basin are being monitored and the assessments
show that the water quality trading is reducing nutrient
loads then measurements will suggest that water quality
has improved. But, there must also be consideration for
the land use, ecological, and hydrological changes that
have taken place within the basin to improve the water
quality. Planning decisions must be arranged before a
water quality trading program is adopted in order to
estimate the positive and negative externalities that
would evolve from this type of policy option.
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